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Volatility and persistence of capital flows 
Chris Becker and Clare Noone
1 
Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, financial globalisation has accelerated as domestic financial 
markets have grown rapidly and a greater proportion of financial capital has come to be 
traded across international borders. Following a period of relatively steady expansion in line 
with world output growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, gross international capital flows 
began to grow more rapidly in the mid-1990s (Graph 1). It is also evident that there have 
been major fluctuations around the uptrend in gross capital flows and occasions when the 
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1  Ratio to world GDP; in per cent. 
Sources: IMF; RBA estimates. 
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While these trends have generally been viewed as a sign of economic development, the 
merits of financial globalisation and integration have attracted an increasing amount of critical 
scrutiny. The proliferation of financial crises in the 1990s has given rise to a body of literature 
that calls into question the unqualified benefits of international integration (Krugman (2000), 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Kose et al (2006)). In particular, the literature has focused on the 
possible disadvantages faced by emerging economies that open up to global capital markets 
prematurely. Key characteristics identified in the literature as determinants of successful 
financial integration include macroeconomic policies, development of domestic financial 
markets, quality of domestic institutions and corporate governance.
3 
In emerging economies, crises have focused attention on the potentially destabilising 
aspects of capital flows over which the domestic authorities have little or no influence.
4 With 
some types of flows typically seen to be inherently more susceptible to sudden reversals, 
one dimension of financial integration that has attracted interest is the composition of the 
overall capital account. The conventional wisdom is that certain types of capital flows are 
more volatile and destabilising than others (Claessens et al (1995)). As a result, flows such 
as foreign direct investment, which are seen to engender a longer-term commitment 
determined by a country’s fundamentals, have come to be viewed as being relatively stable 
and unlikely to reverse without good reason. Because of this perceived lack of skittishness, 
such flows are said to be “cold”. In contrast, flows such as portfolio or bank and money 
market flows are often seen as a form of speculation by investors seeking short-term gains 
and therefore volatile and subject to sharp reversals, exposing recipient countries to the 
whims of international financiers. These flows are correspondingly often described as “hot”. 
This view appeared to be reinforced by the Asian financial crisis, which first erupted in 
Thailand. The characteristics of the capital flows involved in the crisis in Thailand are 
compared in Graph 2 with the types of capital flows received by the United States. The 
United States provides a useful benchmark when considering the scale of the flows involved. 
Thailand and other East Asian economies had current account deficits, as might be expected 
for emerging economies (Lipsey (1999)). Capital was imported through a number of 
channels, with bank lending the predominant source of inflows prior to the crisis. During the 
crisis, it was this short-term foreign currency denominated borrowing that suddenly reversed, 
putting downward pressure on the exchange rate and prompting large-scale foreign 
exchange intervention; it eventually came to be seen as the cause of the deep recession that 
followed (see also Grenville (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (2000)). Direct investment flows 
remained stable during this time, and private sector portfolio flows also showed relatively few 
signs of volatility. This seemed to support the view that bank and money market flows are 
inherently speculative and destabilising, and that they should be discouraged in favour of 
sources of finance, such as direct investment, driven by fundamentals. 
                                                  
3   For a literature survey, see Obstfeld and Taylor (2002). For related discussions on the disadvantages faced by 
emerging economies, possible transitional arrangements and conditions that must exist for countries to gain 
from trade in capital, see Nakagawa and Psalida (2007) and Kose et al (2006). 
4   If capital flows were completely determined by domestic variables such as economic growth and expected 
returns on assets, they would be of little direct policy interest. Instead, the underlying reasons for variations in 
flows would attract the attention of policymakers. On the other hand, if capital flows are not uniquely 
determined (that is, subject to crises of confidence) and are influenced by variables in international capital 
markets that lie beyond the control of domestic policymakers, they may warrant more direct scrutiny (see also 
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1  Ratio to national GDP; in per cent. 
Sources: IMF; Thomson Financial. 
In this paper, we investigate whether different types of capital flows have inherent attributes 
that make them more likely to be associated with variability in the overall capital account. We 
undertake this investigation as it is not immediately obvious why this would be the case over 
time for a diverse group of countries. For example, debt instruments can be structured to 
take on the characteristics of an equity investment, while beyond a certain threshold portfolio 
equity is reclassified as direct investment. Short-term loans that are continually rolled over 
may have characteristics similar to those of longer-term investments, while lumpy cross-
border mergers and acquisitions can cause considerable fluctuations in foreign direct 
investment. Additionally, when domestic markets are deep, liquid and well developed, there 
is no a priori reason to expect that capital entering the host country will necessarily leave it in 
the same form. With financial innovation and a greater degree of financial integration, the 
original source of capital is becoming increasingly remote from the capital’s ultimate 
destination – for example, the financing of an investment project. 
We investigate the statistical properties of the flows to judge whether they are regularly “hot” 
or “cold”. For the purpose of this paper, we put aside the question of whether different forms 
of capital confer desirable economic benefits on the recipient country, such as the transfer of 
technological and managerial know-how often associated with direct investment. Since we 
are interested in assessing the overall volatility of the capital account, we focus largely on net 
flows while acknowledging that gross flows play a crucial role in understanding the 162  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
underlying sources of variability.
5 Throughout we compare the experiences of six advanced 
industrial economies with those of six emerging market economies. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we define our 
concept of variability and apply a number of measures to test the validity of commonly held 
priors. In the third section, we provide several insights into how capital flows interact within a 
country’s capital account and how they interact with the flows of other countries. The fourth 
section provides empirical estimates of possible explanations for capital account volatility that 
may be the subject of future research. The final section provides some concluding remarks, 
while the appendix applies a series of simple econometric techniques to the question at 
hand. 
Variability of the capital account 
There are several methods for measuring the variability of the capital account and its 
components. We take our lead from Claessens et al (1995), but our approach differs from 
theirs in a number of ways. 
Throughout the paper we use standard balance of payments data sourced from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, on a quarterly basis, with the 
US dollar serving as the numeraire. The balance of payments identity imposes the constraint 
that the current account balance (CAB) is equal to the capital account balance (KAB), and 
the two concepts can be used more or less interchangeably. The capital account refers to 
what has become more conventionally termed the financial account and consists of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), portfolio equity (PFE), portfolio debt (PFD), bank and money market 
flows (BMM)
6 and official reserves (RES). We use this disaggregation of the data for the 
remainder of the paper, and while the error term is at times large, we ignore the implications 
of this. Our sample of six advanced industrial economies comprises Australia, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The six emerging market 
economies are chosen based largely on data availability. The three East Asian economies 
are Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. The three Latin American countries are Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico. In the interest of brevity we present most results in terms of the simple 
unweighted average for industrial and emerging economies. Interesting results apparent on a 
country-by-country basis are discussed in their own right. The sample period runs from the 
first quarter of 1980 through the fourth quarter of 2005. 
Composition of cross-border finance 
If a particular type of capital flow reliably exhibits certain characteristics, one could expect to 
find these reflected in the overall capital account. More specifically, as a flow assumes a 
more prominent position in the overall capital account, it may be possible to discern a 
systematic relationship between its volatility and that of the total capital account. This would 
                                                  
5   Debelle and Galati (2005) point out that it is useful to know whether foreigners or domestic residents are 
driving the flows. In preliminary work on gross flows (not shown), we found that net capital flows in emerging 
economies, unlike those in industrial economies, are usually driven entirely by non-residents. This may 
expose emerging economies to sudden changes in the sentiment of foreign investors (see also Calvo (2000)). 
6   In the balance of payments, these flows fall in the category of “other”. As bank loans and money market 
transactions are the main components of this category, we use the more meaningful label “bank and money 
market flows” in referring to them. BIS Papers No 42  163
 
 
be self-evident in the extreme case where the capital account is restricted to just one type of 
flow. 
To test whether such statistical regularities are observable, we disaggregate quarterly 
country data by type of flow, as defined above. We then calculate the average importance of 
each type of capital flow in the overall capital account of every country.
7 This is done over 
five-year blocks in our 25-year sample period. The changing importance of each flow for 
every country is measured as the difference in the flow’s share of total flows from one five-
year block to the next. A positive number indicates that a flow has become more important in 
the overall capital account of the country in question. 
To measure the variability of total net capital flows, we first scale the quarterly capital 
account balance for each country by GDP and then calculate the standard deviation of the 
data over the same five-year blocks. Our gauge of how the variability of the capital account 
has changed is then given by the difference in the standard deviations from one five-year 
block to the next. A positive number indicates that the standard deviation has risen and that 
the capital account of the country in question has become more volatile. 
Graph 3 plots the relationship between the importance of different flows and capital account 
volatility for industrial and emerging economies. The changing importance of the flows is 
plotted on the vertical axis, the changing volatility in the capital account on the horizontal 
axis. Given that we have 12 countries, five types of capital flows and the change over five 
subsamples, the figure plots 240 observations. 
A positive relationship in the scatter plots could signify a systematic relationship between 
more volatile flows becoming more important, thereby raising the average volatility of the 
capital account. Conversely, a negative relationship could be expected if less volatile flows 
were to become more important and capital account volatility could be expected to decline 
eventually. When we fitted regression lines through the data (not shown), no statistically 
significant evidence was found of such relationships. 
For example, Australia saw a rise in the importance of direct investment and a decline in the 
importance of bank and money market flows in the 1990s, relative to the 1980s. While 
preconceived ideas about the rising importance of cold flows and the decline in hot flows 
could lead us to expect lower variability in overall capital inflows, at the margin the opposite 
occurred. Similarly, during the same time the United States experienced a decline in direct 
investment relative to bank and money market flows, but the volatility of overall flows 
declined. 
What is evident, however, is that for industrial economies the observations lie clustered in an 
ellipse around the vertical axis. This means that the composition of finance changes 
noticeably over time between the flows but that this has little consequence for the evolving 
variability in the capital account, which remains relatively stable. The observations for 
emerging economies are more randomly dispersed but show some tendency to lie around 
the horizontal axis. We interpret this as showing that while changes in the composition of 
capital flows are less significant, overall capital account volatility changes noticeably over 
time. These results suggest that evolution in the volatility of the capital account may not be 
systematically related to the capital account’s composition. 
                                                  
7    We take the absolute value of the quarterly flows and the capital account to avoid the problems of 
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1  Standard deviation of capital account as ratio to GDP. 
Source: RBA estimates. 
Volatility of capital flows 
A more direct measure of flow variability is the standard deviation in the ratio of the flows to 
GDP. Scaling by GDP is important because we are most interested in large swings in total 
flows from each country’s perspective and their possible implications for variables such as 
the exchange rate.
8 To capture how flow volatility has evolved over time we calculate the 
                                                  
8   As all flows are expressed in US dollars. GDP is also in nominal US dollars, at current exchange rates. 
However, this measure of output is subject to three different sources of potential variability – prices, real 
 BIS Papers No 42  165
 
 
standard deviations in the quarterly data over a one-year rolling window for each country. For 
expositional reasons, we average the results for industrial economies and emerging 
economies as depicted in Graph 4. 
Graph 4 
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1  Simple average of standard deviation in the ratio of capital flows to GDP. Quarterly 
one-year rolling window. 
Source: RBA estimates. 
Emerging economies have always experienced around twice as much overall volatility in 
their capital accounts as industrial economies. Furthermore, emerging economies have more 
discrete episodes when volatility rises markedly, indicating that they have more frequent 
crises. These outcomes are in line with what we know about emerging economies. 
Developments in the volatility of different flows, comparison with the overall capital account 
and the contrast between the experiences of emerging market and industrial economies yield 
additional insights. 
One of the most noteworthy findings is that while there has been little change in the average 
volatility of total flows, the pattern of volatility has evolved very differently for the various 
flows that make up the capital account. In industrial economies, individual flows are always 
                                                                                                                                                      
output and the exchange rate. Since we wish to avoid attributing the volatility inherent in these variables to our 
measure of capital flow variability, we use the trend of nominal US dollar GDP in the denominator. This 
normally makes very little difference to the measurement of volatility, except in periods when financial crises 
lead to a subsequent collapse in output, which would unnecessarily inflate the measure of capital flow volatility 
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more volatile than total flows, and all flows except for reserves have exhibited a trend rise. 
Given that there is no such time trend in the evolution of the capital account’s volatility, it 
implies a degree of negative correlation between flows, which ensures that aggregate net 
flows are less volatile than their parts. This is an important attribute in that it suggests a 
degree of substitutability between different forms of capital, which allows industrial 
economies to accommodate variability without significant adverse consequences, such as 
frequent crises.
9 
For example, the trend increase in the standard deviation of portfolio debt flows for industrial 
economies is closely aligned with that observed for bank and money market flows. This 
raises the question of whether these flows are complements or substitutes. We found a 
strong negative correlation over time between portfolio debt and bank and money market 
flows, suggesting that the industrial economies are able to substitute different forms of debt 
finance for each other. As a result, the rise in volatility of both types of flows has few 
implications for the overall capital account’s variability. 
Among emerging economies there is no similar generalised trend rise in the standard 
deviation of the flows, and the constituent flows of the capital account are typically less 
volatile than the total. The volatility of bank and money market flows is high but bears little 
resemblance to that of portfolio debt over time. The reliance of some emerging economies on 
bank-intermediated finance while local currency debt markets remain relatively 
underdeveloped may provide a partial explanation for this finding. 
Another interesting feature of the data for industrial economies is the sharp movement in 
foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment earlier this decade. This was due 
primarily to the increase in mergers and acquisitions in European countries, which was 
financed through stock swaps. In these kinds of deals, direct investment is financed by an 
exchange of stock between companies, resulting in a portfolio equity flow that is opposite to, 
and that often fully offsets, the foreign direct investment flow.
10 Once again, because the 
flows move in opposite directions, the effect of rising volatility on the overall capital account is 
fully offset. 
The behaviour of reserve flows is also quite different for the two groups of countries. Not 
surprisingly, reserves are considerably more volatile in emerging economies, where 
monetary authorities are typically more active in foreign exchange markets. It would appear 
that attempts to offset the effects of private flows have been mostly unsuccessful in emerging 
economies, given that the overall capital account remains highly variable at all times.
11 With 
the exceptions of the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
crisis of 1992–93, central banks in the advanced industrial economies, which typically have 
floating exchange rates, play a less activist role in foreign exchange markets; their reserves 
                                                  
9   Levchenko and Mauro (2007) also find that while the overall capital account of emerging economies is more 
volatile than that of industrial economies, portfolio flows in industrial economies are two to five times more 
volatile than those in emerging economies. 
10  The merger of Vodafone Plc in the United Kingdom with Mannesmann AG in Germany is one of the most 
prominent examples of this phenomenon. For more details, see Becker (2003). 
11   The results could be criticised as unfair to emerging economies because the latter experienced a higher 
incidence of crises during the sample period. We argue that the reason we are interested in this topic in the 
first place is because of these crises and that they should be included. However, we recalibrate our results for 
the post-crisis sample period 2000–05. While the smaller sample results are less robust, they lead to the same 
conclusions we present in the main part of the paper. So even under relatively favourable macroeconomic 
conditions without major shocks, emerging economies experience a relatively variable capital account with 
individual flows that are less volatile than the total. Broner and Rigobon (2006) also find that removing outliers 
(ie crises) does not account for the higher volatility of capital flows to emerging economies. BIS Papers No 42  167
 
 
are therefore only around half as volatile as reserves in emerging market economies. Japan 
is an obvious exception and is responsible for the blip in volatility in 2003–04. 
Persistence of capital flows 
A complementary measure of variability is the degree to which capital flows persist over time. 
Cold flows that are perceived to be relatively stable should also display evidence of a strong 
positive correlation with their own past values. The absence of such a correlation would 
suggest that a flow switches sign and is relatively unpredictable. To assess persistence we 
calculate autocorrelation coefficients for each flow in each country over the sample period. 
The data are quarterly ratios of capital flows to GDP, and the correlations are calculated for 
16 lags (Graphs 5 and 6). 
Consistent with the volatility results discussed earlier, total capital flows are found to exhibit a 
high degree of persistence in industrial economies. The autocorrelation coefficients are 
typically large and positive, and they gradually decay as the lags increase. This suggests that 
there is a high degree of persistence in the overall balance of payments for at least one to 
two years. Again we attribute this lack of deviation from a slow-moving trend to the smaller 
number of shocks that affect the current and capital accounts of industrial economies.
12 In 
contrast, there is typically less autocorrelation in the capital accounts of emerging 
economies. Most striking is the result for the Philippines, where there is the least evidence of 
a systematic relationship between the capital account and its own lags. 
Looking at the individual components of the capital account, there is virtually no evidence in 
the autocorrelation coefficients to suggest that the flows systematically exhibit any signs of 
persistence for industrial economies. The coefficients are small and change sign frequently. 
There are, however, a number of notable exceptions. We find that in the United States 
portfolio debt flows are highly persistent. Given that the United States is home to the largest 
debt markets and the US dollar is the world’s reserve currency, this should not come as too 
much of a surprise. Japanese foreign direct investment is also shown to be highly persistent. 
This may reflect the structural “hollowing out” of Japanese manufacturing, as companies set 
up plants in other Asian countries where labour costs are more advantageous. There is also 
persistence in the reserves component of the Japanese capital account, which is probably 
related to the monetary authorities’ presence in the foreign exchange market. 
                                                  
12   We find further evidence of this persistence when we investigate the forecastability of the flows, as shown in 
the appendix. There is some evidence to suggest that the current account of industrial countries is 
endogenous to domestic economic fundamentals such as growth, saving and investment and does not in itself 
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Source: RBA calculations. 
There is little evidence from the advanced industrial economies to support the claim that 
some types of capital flows are inherently more stable than others. Foreign direct investment 
is typically not as stable as what some priors may suggest and can hardly be distinguished 
from the bank and money market and portfolio flows that are often blamed for causing 
instability. 
In emerging economies the evidence is somewhat different. Foreign direct investment is 
often persistent. This can probably be attributed to the fact that these countries are natural 
destinations for foreign direct investment, with inflows typically exceeding outflows. In 170  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
contrast, for industrial economies gross direct investment typically flows in both directions as 
companies merge and are taken over. There are also several other examples of persistence 
in emerging economies, but we suggest that this is unlikely to be an inherent property of the 
flows themselves. 
Interactions between flows 
The results in the preceding sections demonstrate the importance of studying the interactions 
between capital flows, as the co-movement of the flows seems to be central to understanding 
the overall variability of the capital account. What this section further highlights is that the 
analysis of a given type of capital flow in isolation could yield misleading results. Instead, the 
whole of the capital account should be drawn into the analysis, even when we are 
investigating the behaviour of individual components. 
To provide a comprehensive view of the data and how the flows interact, we estimate 
correlation coefficients for each of the flows over the entire period of the sample. The 
quarterly data are summed to annual totals for this purpose. The correlations are estimated 
for each individual flow with every other type of flow within a country’s capital account, as 
well as with each type of flow for all other countries. We are thus able to assess the degree 
of correlation within the capital account as well as across countries. Since we are now 
comparing the flows of capital between countries, we use US dollar amounts and no longer 
scale the flows by the source country’s size. The results refer to the average degree of 
correlation over the sample period, and we acknowledge that there are subperiods within the 
sample period when the correlations rise and fall sharply, which is not fully reflected in this 
section. 
Correlations within a capital account 
We find that correlations between various types of flows within each country’s capital account 
are mainly negative, providing further support for the argument that there may be a degree of 
substitutability between flows. We note that around 70% of industrial economies’ flows are 
negatively correlated within the capital account but that the degree of negative correlation is 
smaller for emerging economies, at 60%. The implication would seem to be that emerging 
economies are less able to substitute between different types of international capital flows. 
Table 1 summarises our general findings on correlation between flows within a given capital 
account. In the interest of brevity we show only the average correlation coefficients for 
industrial economies and emerging economies. 
It is generally difficult to detect any regular correlation patterns for industrial economies. The 
negative correlation between foreign direct investment and portfolio equity flows for countries 
such as the United Kingdom, discussed earlier in this paper, are an exception. Bank and 
money market and portfolio debt flows among industrial economies are also negatively 
correlated. Overall, however, capital appears to come and go irregularly and in different 
forms with no strong link to a particular form of finance and without causing undue 
disturbances in the overall capital account of industrial economies. 
An interesting finding is that the capital account and bank and money market flows are 
always positively correlated for emerging economies and, typically, significantly more so than 
for industrial economies. This strong link may indicate the greater dependence of emerging 
economies on banks, which may also explain why these economies are more vulnerable to 
sudden stops and reversals of flows and why such changes in flows can become full-blown 























Reserves  Capital 
account 
Industrial economies        
Foreign direct investment  1.0           
Portfolio equity investment  –0.4  1.0         
Portfolio debt investment  0.1  –0.3  1.0       
Bank and money market 
flows –0.2  –0.1  –0.3  1.0     
Reserves 0.1  –0.2  0.0  –0.2  1.0   
Capital  account  0.2  –0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 1.0 
Emerging economies        
Foreign direct investment  1.0           
Portfolio equity investment  0.1  1.0         
Portfolio debt investment  0.0  0.4  1.0       
Bank and money market 
flows  –0.2  –0.1 0.0 1.0     
Reserves  –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3  1.0   
Capital  account  0.1 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.0 
Coefficients are calculated on annual values in US dollars and are the simple average of coefficients calculated 
for individual countries. 
Source: RBA calculations. 
 
For emerging economies, there also appears to be a pattern of negative correlation between 
reserves and private flows. In particular, bank and money market flows stand out in the 
country data as always being negatively correlated with official reserve flows. There are two 
possible explanations for this outcome. First, domestic monetary authorities may be aiming 
to offset the effects of bank and money market flows on the overall capital account and the 
ensuing consequences for the exchange rate. Indeed, intervention during the Asian financial 
crisis was squarely aimed at mitigating the sudden reversal of bank and money market flows. 
Nonetheless, it is also feasible that since the capital account must balance with the current 
account, actions to maintain a given exchange rate through variations in reserves will cause 
disturbances in the capital account and expectations, thereby inducing a change in private 
flows. Such disturbances may manifest themselves in such a way that it is typically the bank 
and money market component of the capital account that is most accommodating.
13 
                                                  
13   See also further evidence of this in the appendix, where we investigate the marginal source of finance for the 




The correlation in capital flows between countries may also be useful in understanding 
volatility. Identification of regular relationships may be informative as to why such correlation 
is observable and thus shed some light on the underlying sources of variability. Several 
interesting capital flow linkages across countries are evident and worth highlighting, but once 
again there is no overwhelmingly clear or regular pattern (results not shown). 
While the capital account balance of the United States is significantly correlated with that of 
other industrial economies, there is less evidence of its correlation with the capital accounts 
of emerging economies. Also of note, Japan’s net creditor status is borne out in the negative 
correlation between its total flows and those of other industrial economies that are net capital 
importers, such as the United States and Australia. We take these results to be indicative of 
a relatively high degree of financial integration among industrial economies, while emerging 
economies are less integrated into global financial markets. It is possible that the degree of 
financial market development and integration allows industrial economies to accommodate 
the volatility of individual flows by substituting different types of financing for each other, 
thereby leaving the overall capital account balance relatively stable. 
The capital accounts of emerging markets tend to be positively correlated. Given that these 
balances are also relatively volatile, we suggest that this result may be interpreted as 
evidence that these countries are subject to similar balance of payments shocks – that is, 
they experience crises at the same time, which also reflects a degree of contagion (see also 
Broner and Rigobon (2006)). 
Another interesting aspect of the flows is that they reflect correlations with foreign exchange 
interventions by economies with exchange rate regimes that, to varying degrees, attempt to 
limit currency variations. One would expect that the accumulation of reserves and their 
investment in fixed income assets in an attempt to stem the appreciation of the exchange 
rate (ie a capital outflow) would lead to a negative correlation between reserves in the 
intervening country and portfolio debt flows to the recipient country. We find evidence that 
the reserves of both Japan and Korea are significantly negatively correlated with portfolio 
debt flows to the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Most central banks hold 
reserves in US dollars and invest the proceeds in US Treasuries. The demand for holding 
reserve assets in pound sterling is probably somewhat smaller, but the correlations probably 
reflect that London is a major financial centre through which intervening countries churn their 
investments with an indeterminate eventual destination. The relationship with Australian debt 
may be due to the yield advantages and the liquidity of the Australian dollar, as well as a 
number of other benefits not directly relevant in the context of this paper. While we learn little 
that is new from these findings, we note that the emerging economies’ actions on reserves 
have not subdued the relatively high volatility of their capital accounts. 
Sources of capital account volatility 
In this section we make a first pass at explaining the underlying sources of capital account 
variability. In our study, we discovered certain characteristics that we attempt to condense 
into explanatory variables. The panel data regression that we run is not meant to be an 
exhaustive attempt at modelling capital flows. Rather, it is aimed at testing whether some of 
our broad insights have explanatory power and should be the subject of further research. 
Central to our approach is the generalised finding that industrial economies appear to have a 
greater ability than emerging market economies to substitute different forms of capital for 
each other. As argued earlier, substitutability seems to allow the industrial economies to 
accommodate volatile flows in a manner that leaves the overall capital account relatively 
stable. BIS Papers No 42  173
 
 
Selection of explanatory variables and the model 
The first two variables we consider correspond to those calculated in the section on the 
composition of cross-border finance, above. They reflect the importance of foreign direct 
investment (FDIshare) and bank and money market flows (BMMshare) in the capital account. 
We measure the importance of a flow as the ratio of its absolute value to the sum of the 
absolute value of all flows. Given the work presented in earlier sections, we expect to confirm 
that these variables are not significant in explaining overall capital account variability. 
Another factor potentially relevant to explaining the ability of a country’s capital account to 
absorb the volatility of individual net capital flows appears to be the volume of gross flows. 
Gross capital movements probably reflect three important differences between industrial and 
emerging market economies. The first is that sizeable two-way flows signal not only that 
capital flows are diversified among different types of capital but also that investors are 
diversified and include both resident and foreign entities. Such diversification may limit 
volatility when foreigners sell off their investment because resident investors may fill the void. 
Emerging economies are somewhat dependent on bank financing, and foreign investors 
typically dominate gross flows to these economies. In contrast, industrial economies appear 
to be better placed to reap the benefits from universally large gross flows. Second, limited 
gross flows may reflect the degree of market development. For example, it would be 
unrealistic to expect portfolio debt flows to play a major part in smoothing capital flows in 
economies that do not have well-developed bond markets. Finally, the scope of gross capital 
flows reflects the degree of capital account openness. The less open the capital account, the 
less scope there is for volatility to be absorbed by offsetting flows. 
To gauge the importance of these factors we construct a summary measure based on gross 
flows (FlowOpenness). We create an index that captures the relationship of the absolute 
value of the gross flows to the absolute value of the sum of gross and net flows (see 
equation (1)). When capital flows freely in both directions, we expect the sum of absolute 
gross flows to be large relative to net flows. When this is the case, the index tends towards 
100. When capital flows are not large or are very one-sided, we expect gross flows to be 
small relative to net flows. The most extreme case would be where gross flows are the same 
size as net flows. This would occur if resident or non-resident flows were completely 
restricted. In this case, the index would register zero.
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A further difference between advanced industrial and emerging market economies is the 
degree of development of their domestic financial markets. We suggest that highly developed 
financial markets are probably an important prerequisite for the substitutability of different 
forms of finance. We therefore test whether market development can be linked to capital 
account volatility using the ratio of equity market turnover to market capitalisation as a proxy 
for financial market development (MarketDevelopment). 
We also control for the exchange rate regime under the presumption that if the exchange 
rate is fixed or pegged, more of the burden of external adjustment is borne by quantities than 
                                                  
14  The United Kingdom provides a useful illustration of the index. Despite having an average annual capital 
account surplus of just 2% of GDP over 2000 to 2005, the United Kingdom records an average openness 
index of 96, the highest for any economy in our sample. The high score reflects London’s role as a global 




15 Limiting the nominal variability of the exchange rate may result in more 
adjustment taking place in capital flows, which introduces greater volatility into the capital 
account. To test for the significance of the exchange rate regime we include a dummy 
variable that is zero when the exchange rate regime is a free or managed float, and one if the 
exchange rate regime is less flexible (FXregime). The classification of each country’s 
exchange rate is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions. 
In addition to these explicit variables, by using a fixed-effects estimator we allow for 
unobserved time-invariant factors to influence the volatility of each economy’s capital 
account. 
In summary, the regressions we estimate are of the form: 
it it
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 represents the volatility of the capital account as a ratio to GDP for country 
i, ηi is the fixed effect for country i, εit is the error term and βj denotes the parameters.
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We use a balanced panel of annual data over 1991–2005 for the 12 countries examined in 
this paper. 
Regression results 
The preliminary results shown in Table 2 broadly support the view that while the composition 
of the capital account is not a significant determinant of its volatility, market development and 
a general openness to capital foster substitutability between different forms of capital, which 
helps smooth total capital movements. We also find a statistically significant relationship 
between the exchange rate regime and capital account variability. 
As suggested in previous sections, we find no statistically significant relationship between the 
importance of foreign direct investment or bank and money market flows and the volatility of 
the total capital account. Both variables have p values beyond any reasonable threshold for 
significance. 
The two factors we put forward as potential drivers of substitutability – the development of 
domestic financial markets and the freedom of capital flows – do have a statistically 
significant relationship with the volatility of the capital account. Moreover, the signs of their 
coefficients are consistent with our priors. We find that as the ratio of equity market turnover 
to market capitalisation increases, the volatility of the capital account decreases. Economies 
that experience large two-way gross capital flows also tend to have less volatile capital 
accounts. 
                                                  
15   When the price of one currency vis-a-vis another changes, it imparts valuation changes on the existing stock 
of foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities. These international wealth transfers can be an 
important adjustment mechanism but do not involve the transaction in any quantity of financial assets. 




Panel data estimation results 
 Coefficient  value  p value 
Constant  2.0403 0.0000 
FDIshare  –0.2267 0.8139 
BMMshare  –0.7936 0.1934 
FlowOpenness  –0.0070 0.0834 
MarketDevelopment  –0.4223 0.0335 
FXregime  0.3530 0.0496 
R
2 0.6452   
Number of observations  180   
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation: 0.0000. Dependent variable is the volatility of the capital account. 
Source: RBA calculations. 
 
The exchange rate regime dummy was also found to be significant. When a country 
maintains a fixed rate or a crawling peg, its capital account typically also exhibits higher 
volatility than the capital accounts of countries that allow more flexibility. We caution against 
interpreting this as evidence that fixing the exchange rate causes capital account volatility. 
Rather, the results indicate that the two appear to be related, but further work is necessary to 
address whether they reflect common factors not explicitly considered here or whether the 
relationship is indeed causal. 
Conclusion 
Capital has become increasingly mobile as global financial integration has accelerated. 
Interestingly, while industrial economies have experienced more volatility in individual capital 
flows as financial globalisation has progressed, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
overall capital account has exhibited a trend rise in variability. Indeed, greater financial 
integration may have fostered the substitutability between different forms of international 
finance that helps economies cope with variability. A direct link between financial integration 
and the increased incidence of financial crises in the 1990s appears tenuous. 
We suggest that there are few regular and systematic relationships to be found in the 
statistical properties of capital flows and reject the view that some flows are inherently more 
conducive to stability than others. We also reject the view that the combination of different 
types of capital flows is relevant to the overall stability of the external accounts. 
Given that the substitutability between different forms of capital is stronger for industrial 
economies than for emerging market economies, we suggest that openness to capital flows 
and financial market development may be positively related to overall stability in the capital and 
current accounts. However, we think it unlikely that the stability of the overall capital account in 
advanced industrial economies is attributable to inherent properties of the capital flows. Rather, 
these countries probably meet certain preconditions that allow them to integrate into global 
markets more smoothly, which in turn is reflected in their external accounts.
17 
                                                  





predictability of capital flows 
In this appendix we maintain as simple and transparent an approach as feasible but employ 
basic econometric techniques to investigate whether the findings discussed in the main part 
of the paper are consistent with results obtained under more intense statistical scrutiny. 
Forecasting ability 
One way of ascertaining whether knowledge of a particular flow conveys information useful in 
making inferences about the total capital account is to test how well it can explain 
contemporaneous capital account developments. In other words, we ask if knowledge of the 
composition of the capital account conveys useful information about the total. For this 
purpose we conduct a simple modelling exercise. 
A naïve model is set up where the capital account (KAB) is modelled by its own first lag and 
a constant. That is, the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation  ) 1 (A  below. Given 
the degree of autocorrelation discussed earlier, we expect to find that the coefficients are 
highly significant. Next we add the contemporaneous value of the ith capital flow (Flow) to 
the equation to test whether the fit of the model increases with its inclusion. One would 
expect that if this additional variable were an important determinant of the total its inclusion 
would significantly improve the predictive ability over and above the naïve model. 
i
t t t Flow KAB KAB 2 1 1 0 α + α + α = −  (A1) 
Table A1 reports the main results of these regressions for industrial and emerging 
economies. The rows refer to each of the models run – first the naïve model, then the naïve 
model augmented for foreign direct investment and so on. The root mean squared error 
(RMSE) for each model serves as a measure of the model’s predictive accuracy. For 
expositional purposes, we express the RMSE of the ith model as a ratio to the RMSE of the 
naïve model. As forecasting ability improves and the RMSE declines, this ratio tends towards 
zero. A value of one signifies no improvement over the naïve model; a value greater than 
one, a deterioration in the ability to predict the capital account. In the interest of brevity we do 
not report the ratio for every flow and every country. Instead we distinguish between 
industrial and emerging economies and average the ratios for the six countries in each 
sample to report a summary ratio for each type of flow. The second column lists the countries 
for which we find that the coefficient on the variable of interest is statistically significant. 
The ratio of the errors in the first column indicates that the addition of information about 
individual flows to the forecast of overall capital movements improves the fit by around 5%, at 
best. However, in most cases the additional information adds less than 2% to explanatory 
power, and in some cases there is an outright deterioration. 
As expected, all industrial and emerging economies have highly significant coefficients on 
the lag of the capital account in the naïve model. However, because there is typically less 
persistence in the emerging economies due to the higher incidence of crises, their RMSE for 
the naïve model is around twice as large (not shown). 
None of the individual flows can be shown to systematically add statistically significant 
explanatory power over and above the naïve benchmark for a majority of the industrial 
countries. Portfolio debt flows are statistically significant only for the United States and 




Ability to predict the capital account 
Sample, 1980–2005, quarterly 
Model  RMSEi/ 
RMSENaïve
Countries for which p value indicates significance 
at 5% level 
Industrial economies    
Naïve with lag  1.000  Australia, Germany, Japan, Sweden,  
United Kingdom, United States  
Foreign direct investment  1.003   
Portfolio equity investment  1.000   
Portfolio debt investment  0.989  Japan, United States 
Bank and money market flows  0.998   
Reserves  0.994  Australia , Japan  
Emerging economies     
Naïve with lag  1.000  Argentina, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Philippines, 
Thailand 
Foreign direct investment  1.000   
Portfolio equity investment  1.001   
Portfolio debt investment  0.989   
Bank and money market flows  0.949  Argentina, Korea, Mexico, Thailand 
Reserves  0.988  Brazil, Korea, Philippines, Thailand 
Source: RBA calculations. 
 
In contrast, the relationship between bank and money market flows and the capital account 
appears to be more robust in the emerging economies. For Argentina, Korea, Mexico and 
Thailand, the significance of these flows may reflect a degree of bank dependence, as 
discussed in the paper. Reserve flows are also more typically related to the overall capital 
account in emerging economies than they are in industrial economies. Once again, however, 
the improvement from adding this information to the regression is at best marginal, 
suggesting that there is little to be gained by adding information about individual flows when 
trying to understand capital account developments. 
Marginal source of finance 
In this section we run a set of simple regressions, with the total capital account on the right-
hand side and, separately in turn, each of its components on the left. All variables are in US 
dollars, and we take account of the semiannual change in each over the full sample period. 
The coefficients are constrained to sum to one and may be interpreted in a number of ways. 
If the change in the current account on the right side is interpreted as the financing 
requirement, then the coefficients can be viewed as the responsiveness of each flow to a 
US$1 increase in that funding requirement. The value of the slope coefficients and their 
statistical significance are shown in Table A2. 
One of the first things to note is that many of the estimated coefficients are not statistically 
significant. This may well be because, as we suggest earlier in this paper, there is no 178  BIS Papers No 42
 
 
statistically reliable relationship over time between the current account and the different types 
of capital used to finance it. This is particularly evident for portfolio equity flows, given that 
almost no country has a highly significant coefficient. 
 
Table A2 
Marginal source for financing the current account 
Slope coefficients

















Industrial economies       
Australia   0.52    –0.82   1.01**   0.07   0.22 
Japan   –0.05   –0.12   –0.44    1.29**    0.32 
Germany    0.63**   –0.35*   –0.27*    0.92**    0.07 
Sweden    –0.17   0.00   0.70**  0.49**   –0.02 
United  Kingdom   0.93**   0.04   0.51    –0.52   0.03 
United States    0.43**    0.07   0.07   0.42**    0.01 
Emerging economies       
Argentina    0.15    0.30*   –0.30    0.94**   –0.08 
Brazil   0.06    –0.37**    –0.47   0.54   1.23** 
Korea    –0.07**    –0.11   0.04   0.25   0.89** 
Mexico   0.11**  0.05   0.02   0.55**  0.27** 
Philippines    –0.09*   0.06   0.27**  0.90**   –0.15 
Thailand   0.01   0.03    –0.05   0.90**   0.11 
1  ** Significance at the 5% level or better.    
2  * Significance between the 5% and 10%  levels.    
3  Semiannual 
observations. Due to data availability, the portfolio debt slope coefficients for Korea, the Philippines, Mexico 
and Argentina are calculated on samples starting in the first quarters of 1988, 1996, 1989 and 1992, 
respectively. All samples end in 2005Q4. 
Source: RBA calculations. 
 
Portfolio debt flows are also found to have a relatively low significance for most countries. In 
the medium-sized economies of Australia and Sweden, international transactions in debt are 
found to be highly significant and have a large positive coefficient. With the exception of the 
Philippines, none of the emerging economies are found to have significant debt market 
relationships with the overall flow of capital. We suggest that this is not coincidental. The 
Philippines has had a relatively well-developed government bond market for some time due 
to a history of fiscal deficits, whereas the domestic bond markets of many other emerging 
economies remained underdeveloped for a longer time. As a result, we would not expect 
portfolio debt flows to play a major role in the determination of the overall capital account for 
these economies. 
Foreign direct investment appears to be an important source of finance for a number of 
countries. For emerging economies this is to be expected, in part because these types of 
flows are generally encouraged and the host countries are a natural destination for such 
flows. BIS Papers No 42  179
 
 
However, bank and money market flows are found to be the most responsive to financing 
requirements. The flows are most often found to be statistically significant and have large 
coefficients. Our interpretation of this finding is relatively simple. Banks perform an important 
intermediation function in both industrial and emerging economies. They are typically also 
active in international debt and foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, since banks are 
routinely found on both sides of most of these markets, they act not only as intermediaries 
but also as an important source of arbitrage. Perhaps this function is what makes these flows 
the most flexible and readily adjustable. Banks are most likely to be involved in such 
equilibrating transactions in industrial economies that have large two-way gross banking 
flows. In emerging economies, the importance of bank-related flows, with highly significant 
and large positive coefficients, may reflect a degree of dependence on banks in the absence 
of ready access to non-intermediated debt markets. The claim appears to be supported by 
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